Optimal Monetary Policy in Closed versus Open Economies: An Integrated Approach by Richard Clarida et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES











The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2001 by Richard H. Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source.Optimal Monetary Policy in Closed versus Open Economies:
An Integrated Approach
Richard H. Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler
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economy.  Our main result is that in this model, the optimal policy problem for the small open economy
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optimal policy can be implemented with a Taylor Rule under which the domestic interest rate adjusts to
the equilibrium real interest rate and expected inflation in domestic prices.
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  In Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler ((1999); hereafter CGG), we presented a
normative analysis of monetary policy within a simple optimization-based closed economy framework.
We derived the optimal policy rule and, among other things, characterized the gains from commitment.
Also, we made precise the implications for the kind of instrument feedback rule that a central bank
should follow in practice. In this paper we show how our analysis extends to the case of small open
economy. Openness complicates the problem of monetary management to the extent the central bank
must take into account the impact of the exchange rate on real activity and inflation. How to factor the
exchange rate into the overall design of monetary policy accordingly becomes a central consideration.
Here we show that under certain conditions, the monetary policy design problem for the small
open economy is isomorphic to the problem of the closed economy that we considered earlier. Hence, all
our qualitative results for the closed economy carry over to this case. Openness does affect the
parameters of the model, suggesting quantitative implications. Though the general form of the optimal
interest rate feedback rule remains the same as in the closed economy case, for example, how
aggressively a central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to inflationary pressures depends
on the degree of openness.  In addition, openness gives rise to an important distinction between domestic
inflation and consumer price (cpi) inflation. To the extent there is perfect exchange rate pass through, we
find that the central bank should target domestic inflation and allow the exchange rate to float, despite
the impact of the resulting exchange variability on the cpi (Kosuki Aoki (1999) and Gali and Tommaso
Monacelli (2000)).2
I. A Small  Open Economy Framework
We consider a small open economy model with money, imperfect competition and nominal price
rigidities, similar to Lars Svensson (2000), Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (2000), Gali and
Monacelli (2000) and others. One key difference is that, in addition to having nominal price rigidities in
the form of staggered price setting, we allow for a friction in the labor market in order to introduce a
short run tradeoff between inflation and output.
Only consumption goods are produced and traded.  Households consume a domestic and a
foreign good that are imperfect substitutes.  The domestic good is a composite of a continuum of
differentiated goods, each produced by an associated monopolistically competitive firm at home.  The
home economy is small in the sense that it does not influence foreign output, the foreign price level or
the foreign interest rate; however, the equilibrium terms of trade will depend on both home and foreign
disturbances. We abstract from wealth effects due to current account imbalances by   allowing
households to share consumption risk internationally.  To conserve space, we present   only the  log
linearized version of the model. Accordingly, all variables are expressed as percent deviations from their
long run equilibrium levels.
Household consumption, ct, is a CES composite of home and foreign goods, given in  loglinear
form by





where the superscripts h and f denote home and foreign respectively, and γ measures openness . In turn,
domestic output, yt, is divided between goods sold to domestic residents, c
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            The representative household chooses consumption, labor supply, saving and money holding to
maximize a discounted stream of utility that depends on the consumption index, leisure and real money
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Equation (3) relates the household’s demand for home versus foreign goods to the terms of trade
st, where η is elasticity of substitution. We assume further that the law of one price holds, implying that st
= et  +  p*t  -  pt , where et  the nominal exchange rate,  p*t  is the foreign price level and pt is the price of
domestic output.  Equation (4) is the first order condition for labor supply. The left side is the real wage:
the nominal wage, wt , minus the consumer price level,  pt +   γst . The first term on the right is the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, where nt   is employment, φ is the inverse
of the labor supply elasticity and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The second term, µ
t
w ,
which we call the “wage markup”, reflects frictions in the wage setting that may distort the real wage
from its competitive equilibrium value, (φnt + σct). In general, these frictions may stem from either real
rigidities (e.g. efficiency wages) or nominal rigidities (e.g long term nominal contracts ).  For simplicity,
we take µ
t
w  as an exogenous stationary first order stochastic process.
Among the complete set of state-contingent claims the household may hold are domestic and
foreign one period nominal bonds. Equation (5) is first order condition for consumption versus saving in
domestic bonds, where the real return on domestic bonds is the difference between the nominal interest,4
rt,  and the expected rate of consumer price inflation, E t (πt+1 +  γ ∆s t+1),  given that  πt+1 =  pt+1  -  pt  is
domestic inflation and  ∆s t+1 = st+1 - st  is the rate of depreciation of the terms of trade. In addition, the
option to trade costlessly in foreign bonds implies that, up to linearization, uncovered interest parity will
hold, as expressed by equation (6), where r
*
t  is the foreign nominal interest rate and π
*
t+1  is inflation in
the foreign currency price of foreign goods. Finally, as noted, households have access to a complete set
of international securities markets  to share consumption risk. This assumption together with the
assumption that all exogenous shocks are stationary implies that over time the terms of trade reverts to
the steady state, as follows
 lim i →∞ Etst+i = 0 (7)
We assume that consumption by foreigners is also a CES index of home produced and foreign
goods.  Following Gali and Monacelli (2000), we treat the foreign country as large by assuming that the
weight in the foreign CES aggregator on home goods is negligible. Accordingly, for the foreign country,
output is equal to domestic consumption and consumer price inflation is equal to domestic inflation.  It
follows that foreign demand for domestic output  depends on foreign output,  y*t , and the terms of trade:
c
t
h * = y
t
*  + ηst (8)
where, for convenience, we assume that the elasticity of substitution, η, is the same across countries. In
addition, we can express the consumption euler equation for foreigners as
 r* t – E t π
*
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Equation (9) links the foreign real interest rate to the growth of foreign output, taken here to be an
exogenous stationary process.
The domestic production sector of this small open economy is identical to the closed economy
counterpart of this model. In particular, the domestic consumption good is a CES composite of a
continuum of goods produced at home. Each firm accordingly faces a demand curve with constant5
relative price elasticity that is homogenous of degree one in total demand for home consumption.
Production is linear in labor, the only input, as follows
yt   =    at   +   nt     (10)
where  at is an exogenous, stationary stochastic process for home productivity.
We assume that firms set nominal prices on a staggered basis, following Guillermo Calvo (1983).
Firms changing price in the current period choose an optimal price based on the expected path of
marginal cost.  Firms not changing price simply adjust output to meet demand. Aggregating across firms
leads to the following  “New Phillips Curve” that, in its primitive form, relates domestic inflation to real
marginal cost, mct , and expected future inflation as follows
πt = β Etπt+1   +    δ mct (11)
where, from cost minimization,  mct equals the product wage divided by the marginal product of labor:
mct = wt – pt – at (12)
Equations  (11) and (12) are identical to their counterparts for the closed economy, except that they
pertain strictly to domestic inflation.
II. The Open Economy Policy Problem
Let  y
t
ο  be the natural level of output, defined as the level of output that arises with perfectly
flexible prices and no cyclical distortions in the labor market (i.e., with mct = 0 and µ
t
w =0). Similarly, let
rr
t
ο  and s
t
ο  be the domestic real interest rate and the terms of trade, respectively, that arise in the
frictionless equilibrium. Finally, let xt = yt – y
t
ο  be the output gap. It is then possible to collapse the
model into a system of three equations that determine  xt , πt , and st conditional on the path of the
nominal interest rate:6
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Equation (13) is essentially an “IS curve” that relates the output gap inversely to the domestic
real interest rate and positively to the expected future output gap.  As in the closed economy, holding
constant the frictionless equilibrium, a rise in the domestic real rate reduces aggregate demand, and hence
the current output gap, by inducing intertemporal substitution of consumption. For the open economy,
since the rise in the domestic real rate induces an appreciation of the terms of trade,  there is also an
expenditure switching effect on demand, captured by the influence of the parameter   w on the interest
sensitivity of xt .  The expenditure switching effect causes net exports to move in a direction that
magnifies the overall impact on demand, if the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods,
η, is sufficiently large to satisfy ση  > 1 (implying w > 0), as seems reasonable empirically.
Equation (14) is a short run aggregate supply (AS) curve that relates domestic inflation to the
output gap and a “cost push shock”, ut . As in CGG, the “cost push shock” reflects determinants of
marginal cost that do not move proportionately with the output gap. Here we relate ut  explicitly to the7
wage markup, µ
t
w . (To see, note that marginal cost may be expressed  mct = (
w + 1
σ
 + φ)xt  + µ
t
w  , and
then compare equations (11) and (14)). As emphasized in CGG, the cost push shock introduces a short
run tradeoff between xt  and πt . Finally, equation (15) relates the terms of trade, st, positively to the
output gap. As domestic output rise relative to foreign output the terms of trade must depreciate. To clear
markets, domestic goods must become cheaper relative to foreign goods.
  We next turn to the policy objective. The consideration of the terms of trade makes the objective
differ from what is standard for a closed economy (Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti (2000)).
However, it follows from equation (15) that the “terms of trade gap”, st - s
t
ο  is proportionate to the output
gap, xt. Accordingly, under certain conditions, based on a second order approximation of the household’s
utility function, it is possible to collapse the policy objective to
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where  we use equation (15) to fold st - s
t
ο  into xt.   Equation (16) thus takes a standard form for a closed
economy (see, e.g., Michael Woodford (1999)): a quadratic loss function in the output gap and inflation,
though we emphasize that the latter in this case corresponds to domestic inflation.  To derive equation
(16), we assume that taxes adjust to counteract the distortions in the economy in a way that eliminates
any incentive to create either unanticipated inflation or unanticipated deflation (see Gianluca Benigno
and Pierpaolo Benigno (2000)).
The monetary policy problem for the small open economy thus simplifies to choosing a path for
the nominal interest rate, rt, to minimize the loss (16) subject to the IS and AS equations. As we have
foreshadowed, both the IS and AS curves have the same general form as in the closed economy studied
by CGG: Indeed, as the parameter which reflects openness, γ , goes to zero, w = γ(ση – 1)(2 – γ)8
converges to zero, implying that the coefficients in the IS and AS curves become identical to their
closed economy counterparts.  Similarly, the objective is of the same general form as for the closed
economy. Thus we have,
Result 1: The policy problem for the small open economy  studied  here is  isomorphic to the
policy problem for the closed economy in CGG.
It follows that the feedback rule for nominal interest rate rt as well as the time paths for   xt  and
πt  under the optimal policy are qualitatively the same as in the closed economy case. For the open
economy, of course, the optimal policy also has implications for the terms of trade. From equation (15),
however, conditional on the path of xt under the desired monetary policy and on s
o
t, we obtain an
expression for the optimal path of st .
III. Optimal Policy Under Discretion and Under Commitment
  Under discretion, the central bank re-optimizes each period. Under commitment, the central
bank chooses a binding state-contingent rule. With forward looking price setting and a short run output
inflation tradeoff, as we have here, there are gains from commitment to a rule, as emphasized in CGG,
Woodford (1999) and elsewhere. We begin with discretion and then briefly discuss commitment.
Given Result 1, we follow CGG to derive the solution under discretion. In analogy to the closed
economy case, the optimum is characterized by a “lean against the wind” policy that has the central
bank contract demand as domestic inflation rise above target, as follows,
xt  =  -(λw  /α w  ) π t (17)
The reduced forms for the output gap and domestic inflation, in turn, are given by   
xt =   – λwqwut  (18)
πt =    αw qwut   (19)9
with qw  = 1/[λw
2 + α w(1 - β ρ)] ,  where ρ < 1 is the autocorrelation in the cost push shock. In general, a
positive cost push shock induces the central bank to contract demand to moderate the impact on domestic
inflation. Overall, the policy aims for gradual of convergence of domestic inflation to target (note that the
cost push shock is stationary), except in the extreme case where the policy objective places zero weight
on the output gap (i.e., αw  = 0.)    An interest rate feedback rule which implements the optimal policy is
                                                rt =  rr° t  + b Etπ t+1   (20)
with b = 1 +  [σ⁄ (1 +ω)](λw /α w)(1 - ρ)/ ρ  >1. The central bank should respond to expected deviations
of domestic inflation from target by adjusting the nominal rate sufficiently to have the real rate move in a
stabilizing manner. The rule is of the same form as for the closed economy. International factors are
relevant to the extent they affect domestic inflation or the equilibrium real rate, rr° t .
Under the optimal policy, cpi inflation is more volatile than domestic inflation. The monetary
tightening that follows a positive cost push shock also induces an appreciation in the terms trade (see
equations (15) and (18)), which moderates the initial impact on the cpi. Over time, however, the terms of
trade depreciates, causing cpi inflation to rise above domestic inflation. In addition, the optimal policy
has the central bank accommodate real shocks that move the equilibrium terms of trade, also causing the
cpi to vary relative to the domestic price index.
With commitment possible, the optimal policy is history dependent, as stressed by Woodford
(1999), CGG and others. Following CGG, in this case, the optimal policy has the change in the output
gap adjust to deviations of inflation from target:





πt   (21)
Roughly speaking, the “difference” rule exploits the dependence of current behavior on expectations of
future policy. Equation (21) implies





pt   (22)10
which suggests that the policy is interpretable as domestic price level targeting. It remains optimal,
however, to accommodate movements in the terms of trade.  Even with commitment, accordingly,
pegging the nominal exchange rate does not produce the best policy.11
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